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RECENT DECISIONS
to circumvent the statute relative to resident licenses ?" The final con-
clusion we already have.
The determination in the instant case is indeed a far cry from those
decisions of not many years past, holding a corporation incapable of
acting beyond the state of its creation.6 Here we have a foreign cor-
poration, represented merely by stock ownership, held capable of "a
fraud or an illegal act" in the event that the domestic corporation, in
which it is financially interested, applies for a license procurable by
residents of the state.? From the opinion,8 there appears no ground of
objection to the conduct of the proposed business by the domestic cor-
poration. Assuredly, if facility of control be the desideratum, a domestic
corporation would seem preferable. Apparently, the Court, following
the interpretation of the Insurance department "under facts so similar
as to make the situation almost parallel," has seen fit to superimpose a
further requirement in addition to that of residence, and will insist that
the source of the capital used be domestic. In a word, the rule here
enunciated seems neither practicable in administration nor conducive to
the honest and convenient conduct of business.
DOMESTIc RELATIONS-MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT-FORMER HUSBAND
OR WIFE LIVING.-The petitioner seeks an annulment of his marriage
with the respondent under section 3004 of the Delaware Code, providing
that the court may annul a marriage contracted while either part), has a
husband or wife living. It appeared that the wife had a husband living
when she married the petitioner, but that the petitioner, after he had
learned that she had not been divorced from her former husband, had
continued to live and cohabit with her. The court granted the annul-
ment on grounds of public policy, holding that the equitable maxim of
unclean hands was not applicable in such a case. Seacord v. Seacord,
139 Ati. 80, Advance Sheets of November 24. 1927.
The question at issue in this case was whether or not the act of the
petitioner in cohabiting with the respondent after knowledge of the prior
existing marriage precluded the granting of relief. At the common law
such a marriage was absolutely void.' By the statutes of Delaware such
a marriage was unlawful.2  The rule of par! delicto does not apply in
annulment cases. Because the state is an interested party the equitable
maxim that "He who comes into equity must do so with clean hands"
cannot be resorted to." Rice. J.. in directing the entry of a decree annul-
ing the marriage, referred to what is considered the leading case in New
See I St. John's L. Rev. 48.
The fact that the relator had been incorporated in Ohio prior to the
passage of the resident agents law was regarded as "immaterial."
9 The record upon which the court passed may have included further facts,
but the opinion is apparently based upon the conviction that the relator had
resorted to subterfuge.
12 Schouler on Marriage, Divorce. Separation and Domestic Relations,
6th ed.. 1386.
2 Delaware Rev. Code, 1915. §§ 3004. 3008 and 4785; also § 3016 Rev. Code
1915, as amended by chapter 217, 28 Laws of Delaware.
3 2 Schouler, op. cit., supra, note 1, 1420.
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York on this point.4 In that case it was held that since a polygamous
marriage was void under the New York Domestic Relations Law, and
since an action to annul such a marriage on that ground is expressly
authorized, such a marriage being void and not voidable, could not be
ratified under the weight of controlling authority; 5 the case further held
that the fact that the parties lived together after it was competent for
them to contract a legal marriage was no bar to an action for annulment.
As opposed to this doctrine there is a recent decision in which the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey refused, on a very similar state of
facts, to grant an annulment, on the ground that it would not permit one
to thereby gain an unfair advantage over the other, and holding that the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands was applicable.6 It is of interest
to note that while in the case under review the petitioner did not know of
the existing marriage until after his marriage to the respondent, in most
of the New Jersey cases cited in support of the Keller case there was
such knowledge from the beginning.7 However, the New Jersey decision
is contrary in spirit to the New York cases above referred to and to the
case first reviewed.
FRAuD-REsCISSION-INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIOS-ACTIONS AT
LAw.-The plaintiff purchased certain corporate notes from the defend-
ant upon the latter's representation that they were, or were to be, listed
on the New York Stock Exchange. This statement was in fact false,
though innocently made. The plaintiff immediately upon ascertaining
the facts rescinded the sale, offered to return the securities and demanded
back the purchase price. The defendant refusing to comply with the
plaintiff's request, the latter brought this action at law on the rescission
to get its money back. The judgment of the Trial Term dismissing the
complaint was affirmed by the Appellate Division, but the Court of
Appeals reversed these rulings and held that the plaintiff made out a
cause of action. Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. zv. A. B. Leach & Co., Inc.,
247 N. Y. 1 (1928).
The principal question in this case arose regarding the remedy
sought by the plaintiff. It did not attempt to prove that the misrepresen-
tations were fraudulently made, but sought relief by proving that the
representations were false in fact and misled the plaintiff into making
the purchase. This is the same ground for which an action might be
maintained in equity.' But the plaintiff did not seek equitable relief, but
rather only sought the return of its money, which constitutes a proper
action at law.2 The rule that it is not necessary that the misrepresenta-
tion should have been known to the party making it to be false, applies
4 Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1910).
3 Petit v. Petit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (1905).
6 Keller v. Linsenmeyer, 139 At. 33, Advance Sheets of November 24,
1927.
7 Edtl., N. Y. L. J., Feb. 14, 1928, at 2336.
'Bloomquist v. Farson, = N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918).
2Bosley v. Nat. Machine Co., 123 N. Y. 550, 555, 25 N. E. 990 (1890);
U. S. v. Bitter'Root Dev. Co., 200 U. S. 451 (1906) ; Equitable Life Assurance
Society v. Brown. 213 U. S. 25. 50 (1909) ; Curriden v. Middletown, 232 U. S.
633 (1914).
